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If You Do Not Change Your Behaviour: Managing Threats
to State Security in Lithuania under Soviet Rule1
[She] was warned that, in the event of a repetition on her part ofsimilar remarks, more severe measures of influence would be appliedto her. 2
IntroductionJust forty years ago, on 31 October 1975, KGB chairman Yurii Andropovmade a “top secret” report to the members of the Central Committee ofthe ruling Soviet Communist Party. The subject of his report was perhapsthe largest and most effective programme for personally targetedbehaviour modification anywhere in the world at that time outside schooland college.3
1 This is a paper to a panel on “Identifying the Enemy: Secret Policingand Censorship in a Frontline Soviet Republic” at the annual conventionof the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies,Philadelphia, 20 November 2015. Preliminary versions of this paper werepresented (under a slightly different title) to the Department of EconomicHistory of the London School of Economics on 19 March 2015, the HistoryFaculty of the University of Vilnius on 15 May 2015, and the CAGEConference on Institutions and Social Norms in Economic Development atthe University of Warwick on 11 July 2015. I thank the participants fordiscussion, Ed Cohn and Amir Weiner for advice, Ed Cohn and AmandaSwain for giving me access to their unpublished work, and YuliaBashirova for research assistance. I am grateful to the Hoover Institutionfor its generous hospitality and support of the annual Hoover InstitutionWorkshop on Totalitarian Regimes; and the staff of the Hoover Library &Archives for their patience and expertise. The uses of personal data forthis project are governed by conditions agreed with the University ofWarwick’s Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics sub-committee.
2 Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Lietuvos SSR ValstybesSaugumo Komitetas, Selected Records of the Lithuanian Special Archive(Lietuvos ypatingasis archyvas – LYA), collection K-1, inventory 3, file 682(hereafter Hoover/LYA Hoover K-1/3/682): 12-12ob (Klaipeda KGB firstdivision commissioner lieutenant Kulikov, report on implementation ofprofilaktika, 12 December 1970).
3 I believe this must be the case. Stalin did not use preventivewarnings; his remedy for enemies, including "potential" and"unconscious" enemies, was to remove them. The Chinese did not usepreventive warnings as far as I am aware, because they lacked the
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In the war on anti-Soviet activity, Andropov said, we are winning. Hebegan by pointing to a steep decline in the number of prosecutions forstate crimes such as treason and anti-Soviet agitation—from more than1,300 a year at the end of the 1950s to less than half that number in theearly 1970s. The figures he used are shown in Table 1. But what factorswere driving this success? Andropov proposed four factors:The further reinforcement of the moral-political unity of our society;the growth of political consciousness of Soviet people; the correctpenal policy of the Soviet state; and the dominant role of preventive-
warning work to deter criminality (my emphasis).In Andropov’s analysis, behind the decline in crimes committed lay anincrease in crimes prevented. Andropov went on to show that the KGBwas issuing preventive warnings to tens of thousands of people eachyear—and that these warnings were outstandingly effective. Out of the120,000 that received such a warning between 1967 and 1974, just 150,or barely more than one per thousand, were subsequently brought tocourt charged with a state crime. In short, prevention worked.Prevention was the core mission of KGB counter-intelligence: tofrustrate the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and to suppress“the disruptive activities of the organizations and persons that theyexploit” (Nikitchenko et al. 1972). This mission required both punitiveand preventive actions, symbolized by the sword and shield of KGBinsignia. In Stalin’s time, the sword ranked above the shield, which waslittle used. Andropov’s data show that, by his time, actions of the shieldoutnumbered those of the sword by twenty to one.Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the system of preventive warningsbecame the front line of the KGB struggle with individual nonconformityin Soviet society. The growing emphasis on profilaktika wasacknowledged in private (Chebrikov et al. 1977: 503-504) and has sincebeen outlined in the published work of political scientists and historians(Knight 1990: 184, 193-197; Elkner 2009: 153-156; Fedor 2011: 51-56;Hornsby 2014: 211-212). As yet, we lack detailed evaluation of its scope,working methods, and outcomes (but look out for Cohn 2015, inpreparation). The project summarized in the present paper aspires to fillin a few of the blank spaces.
capacity it required, and they relied on mass struggle to align personalbehaviour, not personal threats or suasion. And I cannot think that therewas another large population on which a similar method was practised.Capitalist advertising does not count; at this time it was not personallytargeted, and besides it did not threaten anyone with the consequences offailure to respond. If you know differently, however, contact me.
3
Table 1. Prosecutions for state crimes and preventive warnings in the Soviet
Union, 1959-1974 1959-62 1963-66 1967-70 1971-74Prosecutions, total 5,413 3,251 2,456 2,423Of which, for:Treason 1,010 457 423 350Espionage 28 8 10 9Anti-Soviet agitationand propaganda 1,601 502 381 348Smuggling 47 103 183 474Violation of currencyregulations 587 474 382 401Illegal border crossing 926 613 704 553Disclosure or loss ofstate secrets 22 31 19 18Other crimes 1,003 1,011 328Preventive warnings,total … … 58,298 63,108Of which, for:Having suspiciouscontact with foreignersor holding treasonousintentions … … 5,039 6,310Taking part in anti-Soviet activity … … 35,316 34,700Warned withinvolvement of the public … … 23,611 27,079Of which:At general gatherings ofworkers and staff, incomradely courts, etc. … … 10,624 11,836In the form ofdiscussion withrepresentatives ofpublic opinion … … 12,987 15,243Formally cautioned(1973-74 only) … … … 981Tried on criminalcharges, of thosepreventively warned … … 100 50Source: The figures reported here were first published by Pikhoia (1998:365-366). A copy of the original is found in the Hoover Institution Library& Archives, Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, container 28 (reel 18)(USSR KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, memorandum “Concerning someresults of the warning and preventive work of the organs of statesecurity,” 31 October 1975).
4
EvidenceMy evidence base is KGB records from Soviet Lithuania, held on microfilmat the Hoover Institution, based on paper records in the LithuanianSpecial (KGB) Archive: more than a million pages of risk assessments,action plans, case files, reports, audits, bulletins, correspondence, andtranscripts of interviews and meetings from 1940 to the 1980s.In the course of preparing this project I have begun to collectdocumentation on two aspects of profilaktika, its evolution and itspractice. As discussed below, evidence from the Baltic cannot provide acomplete picture of the history, but is certainly suggestive. As for thepractice of profilaktika, this paper reports work in progress. I haveassembled hundreds of records of “preventive discussions.” The recordsare being digitized; at a later stage of this project, I will anonymize them,code them, and turn them into data for quantitative analysis.In framing these objectives, I draw on several secondary literatures inhistory and social science. The problem of public loyalty and privatedissent under communism has been dissected by Inkeles and Bauer(1959), Kuran (1989), and Wintrobe (1998). The role of the KGB in Sovietrule is the subject of Knight (1990), Albats (1995), Weiner (2006); Fedor(2011), and Hornsby (2014). The establishment of Soviet rule in the Baltichas been mapped out by Reklaitis (2007), Tannberg (2010), Statiev(2010), and Weiner and Rahi-Tamm (2012). Mass disturbances undercommunism are catalogued by CIA (1983) and Kozlov (1999); on thebloody suppression of particular outbreaks see Baron (2001) andBarenberg (2014). In this short paper I give some attention to the Kaunasevents of 1972, detailed by Swain (2013).
A public health missionThe language of profilaktika owes something to political epidemiology. Inthis view of human behaviour, words and actions that undermine theexisting order are “unhealthy.”4 Initial outbreaks are random andunpredictable but, once established, they can spread like a communicabledisease. In this analogy, some people carry infection, while others aresusceptible. When a disease breaks out it spreads through informalnetworks that bring susceptible people into contact with carriers. Someare more susceptible than others, in particular young people and
4 The subject of a preventive warning, “while in a café, made unhealthyremarks” on various topics, including “specifically in relation to personsof Russian nationality.” Hoover K-1/3/682: 25-27 (Klaipeda city andLithuanian seaport KGB first division senior lieutenant Kelauskas, reporton profilaktika, April 1970).
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educated people. The disease spreads first among persons of highersusceptibility. If unchecked, as levels of exposure increase, it can alsospread to those less susceptible and become endemic.In any society, the control of infectious diseases requires public healthinstitutions. It is no surprise to find that in the field of “unhealthy”behaviour the KGB carried out all the functions of a public healthorganization. These began from historical records and mass surveillanceand extended to protective isolation, triage, and intervention.5 KGBrecords and surveillance allowed the use of personal markers(“kompromat”) to identify the most likely carriers of disloyalty. The KGBobtained these markers partly from past records of individual and familyattributes and attitudes, partly from current signals by informants.Informants were a scarce resource, and the KGB deployed themparticularly where those most at risk of infection tended to gather: theeducational, science, and production establishments that trained and
employed bright young people (Harrison and Zaksauskienė 2015). In turn, mass surveillance formed the basis for rapid intervention. Asone would expect of a public health agency, KGB intervention began withtriage, identifying the three classes of people that could be respectivelyremoved, treated, or ignored.
Figure 1. Triage of Citizen X
Note: KGB triage is not described anywhere in exactly these terms, but iseasily inferred from the distinctions made in KGB training documentssuch as Nikitchenko et al. (1972) and Chebrikov et al. (1977).
Figure 1 illustrates the criteria that qualified Citizen X for any one ofthese three options. At one extreme, intentional perpetrators of statecrimes merited removal (to prison, exile, or the death cell), which would
5 Thus a 1964 resolution of the KGB collegium included “protection ofSoviet citizens from bourgeois ideology” among the goals of profilaktika,cited by Chebrikov et al. (1977: 584) and noted by Elkner (2009: 152).
Behaves well
Behaves badly
Ignore
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punish them and protect society. At the other extreme, citizens that werealready sufficiently immunized by government schooling and partypropaganda would conform to authorized norms of behaviour withouttreatment and could be ignored. In between was the middle group, the“politically immature, confused” citizens who from time to timecommitted “politically damaging misdemeanours” that were not yet statecrimes but could become state crimes if unchecked (Nikitchenko et al.1972: 220, 237). As long as these people did not declare an intention tocause harm to the Soviet social and political order, they could be treatedby profilaktika, allowing them to remain in society.
An incomplete historyProfilaktika originated in the 1930s as a concept, from which it evolved inthe 1940s and 1950s into an expedient; only in the 1960s did it becomethe central element of the KGB strategy for achieving regime security. Ourview of this history is incomplete because most of it lies hidden in Russianstate archives that have never been opened.The concept of profilaktika can be traced back to February 1934 (ifnot earlier), when OGPU chief Yagoda defined the goal “to prevent crimebefore it happened rather than react to crime after it occurred” (Shearer2009: 125). At that time, Shearer notes, the security police lacked thecapacity to implement the concept. Prevention of potential state crimesgave way to imprisoning and killing potential state criminals.After the war, and perhaps even before, profilaktika became anexpedient. We can see only what happened in the Baltic region, but this isenough for informed guesswork. The two occupations evidently gave riseto new problems that demanded new solutions. Immediately, there wasthe problem of what to do with the priests of the Catholic Church in thewestern borderlands, given that it was decided not to imprison them all.6In the early 1950s, another problem specific to the western borderlandsbecame acute: how to bring back into society (“legalize”) those youngmen that had taken to the forests at the end of the war. In the mid-1950s a
6 Already on the occasion of the first occupation of Lithuania in 1940,Moscow recommended preventive warnings for the NKVD toolkit tomanage the Catholic Church. “Make a practice of summoning the bishopsto the NKVD with the aim of warning them of [their] responsibility for theanti-Soviet actions of the priests under their rule.” Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/149: 125 (USSR People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beriia andhead of chief administration of state security Merkulov, memo to Soviet
Lithuania People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Guzevičius, no date but not later than January 1941).
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third problem arose when tens of thousands of former prisoners and“special settlers” came home from Siberia.Each of these groups was substantial in number and included peoplewho could be thought of as relatively dangerous to the regime. Preventivewarnings generally turned out to be an effective way of managing them.7One supposes (but direct evidence is lacking) that in Moscow someonemade the following calculation: if preventive warnings could manage therelatively dangerous people, who were numbered in tens or hundreds ofthousands, but were still only a tiny percentage of the total Sovietpopulation, would the same methods not also work in the less dangerouscases that were potentially far more numerous?Somehow or other, within thirty years profilaktika moved fromconcept to expedient to strategy, eventually becoming the key to regimesecurity that Andropov described to the Central Committee in 1975.
Application and scopeAnyone who studies profilaktika has a favourite story.8 Here, for reasonsof space, the reader must make do with Amy Knight’s (1990: 184)summary:If for example the KGB learns that a Soviet citizen is having contactwith foreigners or is speaking in a negative fashion about the Sovietregime, this citizen is called in for a “chat” and efforts are made to sethim or her straight.The chat was not violent and it specifically did not take the form of aninterrogation (Elkner 2009: 153). It was meant to be a two-way exchangethat would lead to mutual understanding. The KGB wanted to understandthe causes of the subject’s bad behaviour and help the subject understandthe possible consequences. The discussion could be two-way, but it was
7 For example, returnees from Siberia: Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/557: 2-5(Soviet Lithuania KGB commissioner for Balninkai district Šatas, report“On the status of work among persons returning from detention andspecial settlement,” 21 April 1959) and many similar district reports. Onnumbers in various categories subjected to profilaktika see for exampleHoover/LYA, K-1/3/558: 41-48 (Soviet Lithuania KGB commissioner forVarniai district captain Misonas, report “On the status of agent-operativework in relation to bourgeois nationalists and returnees from places ofdetention, exile, and special settlement on the territory of Varniaidistrict,” 5 September 1959) and many similar district reports.
8 Some of mine are told in Harrison (2015: chapter 5).
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not open-ended. There was always a desired outcome, which was for thesubject to acknowledge having made a mistake and to pledge to correct it.At a later stage of this project I expect to give a more precise accountof the scope of profilaktika—the range and frequency of types of personsand of behaviours that merited preventive treatment. For the time being,my impression of cases that seem to recur in the files includes people whogot drunk and praised capitalism or spoke out against communism; whopassed on subversive jokes; who wrote anonymous letters or leaflets;who were too curious about secret matters (including most political,economic, and military matters); who were too interested in foreign andpre-Soviet culture and art; who listened to foreign radio broadcasts andpassed on what they heard; who met foreign visitors without permission;who did what young people often do in ports (trade with foreigners ingoods, currency, and sex); or who behaved badly while travelling abroador at the border.As can be seen from Table 1, profilaktika could be applied toindividuals and to groups; the latter were relatively infrequent butextended to numbers of persons in double figures. Profilaktika could bedelivered in private or public, but the artistic direction and stagemanagement of public warnings clearly required more effort, and KGBdocuments often imply that they should have done more along this line.
The Kaunas eventsA case study in the wider exercise of profilaktika is provided by theKaunas events of 1972. These events began with young people in a publicsquare and a heroic, suicidal gesture (for a contemporaneous account seeRemeikis 1972). There were two days of demonstrations in Kaunas andminor disorders in a dozen other towns. These disorders expressed deep-seated grievances, but did not give rise to persistent turmoil. They werequickly suppressed by force; the force was calculated and discriminating,without bloody reprisals, mass arrests, or executions. This outcome isremarkable in two contexts, one being our knowledge of massdisturbances under communism, in which episodes involving violent,incompetent state thuggery are salient; the other being the intensenational resistance to Soviet rule in Lithuania before 1953 and after 1987.In 1972, apparently, secret police work in Lithuania was effective.How was it done? The answer seems to be: mostly by normal methodsand, in particular, by the intensified application of profilaktika.Numbers involved in the disturbances to public order were 3,000 to3,500, or around one in 12 of the population of Kaunas aged 15 to 24—animpressive turnout, given that any coordination was strictly informal andwas confined to word of mouth and the phone. On the first day 400
9
demonstrators were arrested; on the second day none were arrestedalthough many were beaten. After that, there were no more massdisorders, but there were many minor incidents in a dozen small townsaround Lithuania (catalogued by Swain 2013).The protestors’ profile can be inferred from those detained. Thesewere mostly male, aged 15 to 24; most were in work, school, or college.They were not typical citizens of Lithuania, but they were not drop-outsor marginal elements; one in four belonged to the Komsomol. If anything,they were typical prospective members of Soviet Lithuania’s future elite.Once the streets were cleared, KGB triage went to work. Officialpunishment was highly selective. Only 40 of the detained, around one in ahundred of the demonstrators, received a formal punishment, and formost of these the penalty was 10 to 15 days in the police cells, imposedwithout a court hearing. Eight young people were set aside as enemies, tobe removed from society. They were put on trial, charged with violentdisorder, and imprisoned for one to three years. They were chosen,evidently, on three criteria: from the 500 that were first to gather on theevening of the funeral; from the front row of the marchers on the first dayof demonstrations; and from those with an existing police record.9No one was killed or executed. In noting this I do not mean to trivializethe impact on the lives of the young people who were singled out forimprisonment. But, when compared to the blood spilled indiscriminatelyon the streets of Novocherkassk, Budapest, and other cities under similarcircumstances, the outcome was a model of restraint.While a handful were punished, many were warned. Again, KGB triagewas at work. The documentation divides the detainees into two groups,workers and students. Nearly two hundred blue-collar workers weredetained. For them, the standard treatment was “preventiveconversations … measures of an educational character … exploits werediscussed in workplace meetings.” A few were given a rougher time:“Some individual ill-intentioned violators of labour discipline” weredisciplined (probably demoted or moved to lower paid work).10Also detained were nearly 150 school and college students. Thesewere also taken down the route of the preventive conversation. At thesame time, many were quietly expelled from their courses. This would
9 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/793, 142–149 (Lithuania KGB chairman Juozas
Petkevičius, report, not dated but May 1972). 
10 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/703: 170–174 (Lithuania KGB Kaunas city chiefBagdonas and third division chief Trukhachev, “Report on measures forimplementation of the decree of the Lithuanian Communist Party centralcommittee of 30 May 1972,” 17 August 1973).
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have broken up their classroom friendship networks, forcing them outinto the frostier world of work quotas and hierarchies of seniority.As far as most participants in the Kaunas disturbances wereconcerned, therefore, the KGB response was simply to continue to dowhat it had done before, but to do it more systematically and moreintensively. Moreover, this strategy worked.
How profilaktika workedIn a post-mortem on the Kaunas events, the KGB commented on the heavyapplication of profilaktika:Such measures, as a rule, have positively influenced not only thosepreventively warned, but also those around them, and have helped touncover the factors giving rise to unwanted manifestations, toeliminate defects, and to improve educational work in the college andworkplace collectives of those being warned.11In line with the phrasing of this assessment, it is convenient to thinkabout the aggregate effects of profilaktika in two parts, the primary effecton the subject, and a consequential or secondary effect on the subject’scontacts, and through this more generally on society as a whole.
Primary effect: “Those preventively warned”Of 885 persons interviewed over 18 months from 1 January 1973, theKGB reported, only 9 (one per 100) had to be warned a second time. Sothe message from Kaunas to Yurii Andropov was: You’re right! The rate ofrecidivism following a KGB preventive warning was astonishingly,magically low.How did the magic work? The primary effect on a person wasachieved in a few minutes. KGB records of preventive discussions show, innearly all cases, that in the course of a single conversation the subjectworked from shock and confusion through denial and negotiation toacceptance of the KGB’s censure of their behaviour and a clear promise tochange course. (I hope to be more precise in a future version of thispaper.) The preventive discussion was, apparently, a life-alteringmoment.
11 Hoover/LYA, K-1/3/717: 123–130 (Lithuania KGB fifth departmentdeputy chief Stalauskas, second administration third department deputychief Grishechkin, and senior inspector under the Lithuania KGBchairman Malakhov, “Report on the condition of preventive work in theLithuania KGB and measures to improve it,” 17 October 1974).
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Reading between the lines, one cannot avoid the conclusion that thekey to the primary effect was fear. In the opening minutes of thediscussion, the subject learned that the KGB had easy access to theirprivate life, attitudes, and behaviour. This access arose from betrayal bythe subject’s confidants, even if their precise identity was generallyconcealed. Isolated and compromised, the subject was also threatenedwith severe consequences of persisting on the course previously set. Thesubject had every reason to fear these consequences. In the recent past,the KGB’s predecessor had executed millions and imprisoned or resettledtens of millions. In the present, the KGB had authority to intervene in anyaspect of the life of the citizen and the citizen’s family members farbeyond the limits of a conventional police agency, including in residence,school, work, prospects for further education and promotion,opportunities for foreign travel, and even psychiatric status.The discussion changed the subject’s course; did it also change minds?There is no reason to think so. But most likely the KGB did not expectsincere repentance. In the 1950s Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauerinterviewed thousands of Soviet emigrants about their experience ofSoviet rule. They concluded (1959: 283) that Soviet rulers understoodperfectly that many of their citizens held grievances and would havedisloyal thoughts. They did not expect inner loyalty. They were satisfiedto “assure reliable behavior regardless of how the citizen might feel aboutthe regime.”
Secondary effect: “Also those around them”The direct influence of the preventive discussion on the subject was onlythe start, however. If it was also the finish, it could not be a large effect onthe community, for profilaktika was not practised on a large enough scaleto reach significant numbers of people directly. Table 2 shows that, ineight years, profilaktika touched the lives of fewer than one per thousandresidents of Soviet Lithuania (perhaps one in five hundred of those inwork and college)—and the rate for the Soviet Union as a whole was onlyhalf of the rate in Lithuania. Over the same period, in other words, 99.8percent of working-age Lithuanians had no direct contact with the KGB.KGB officers maintained that the changed behaviour of “thosepreventively warned” exerted a wider influence on “those around them”at home, at work, at school or college, and in the neighbourhood, by forceof example. Only when the secondary (or exemplary) effect is taken intoaccount can we ascertain the aggregate effect of profilaktika on society.The exemplary effect of coerced conformity was already noted by Inkelesand Bauer (1959: 290). When the citizens inclined to disloyalty could becoerced into the appearance of loyalty, and those watching them followedtheir example out of the perceived lack of any viable alternative, everyone
12
obtained “an exaggerated picture of actual loyalty” which in turnreinforced and sustained the status quo (see also Kuran 1995: 261-276).
Table 2. Rates of preventive warning, 1967 to 1974, Soviet Union and Soviet
Lithuania Soviet Union Soviet LithuaniaResident population, 1970 241.7 million 3.128 millionPreventive warnings (1967-74):Total 116,406 2,987Per million residents 481 955Per million per year 60 119Sources: Resident populations on 15 January 1970 are from TsSU (1972:10). Persons subject to preventive warning, 1967 to 1974: in the SovietUnion, calculated from Table 1, and in Soviet Lithuania, calculated fromannual figures compiled and tabulated by Cohn (2015).
Thus the aggregate effect of profilaktika combined coercion of a fewwith the persuasion of many. This combination suggests how a regimecould have coercion at its core, yet millions would live their lives withoutpersonal experience of it. Every citizen heard the party propaganda andsaw the realities of their own lives. Very many were likely to have hadsome experience of secrecy and censorship. But the great majority had nopersonal contact with the KGB. They felt the influence of KGB coerciononly through what they did not see or hear: the colleague or neighbourwho used to complain, used to share a joke and pass on a rumour, or usedto voice the dream of a different life, but did so no longer.
Preliminary conclusionsIn Soviet society most people would fall into line with official normsprovided they were not exposed to infectious examples of “unhealthy”nonconformist behaviour. Good examples and an absence of bad oneswould nudge them into the uniform template of “healthy” behaviour andkeep them there. A small minority, however, would be kept in line only byan unmistakeable and unforgettable threat.The primary and secondary effects of profilaktika matched therequirements of each group. The primary, coercive effect was on theminority. Based on mass surveillance, the KGB identified the few thatmerited a threat and delivered it personally to each of them, securingtheir cooperation in nearly all cases. While the numbers frightened intoconformity remained tiny in relation to the large Soviet population, theyreached tens of thousands per year. These figures suggest that, by the1970s, the KGB’s use of “preventive warnings” had become the largest
13
and most effective programme for individually targeted behaviourmodification in the world outside an educational setting.Profilaktika also had a wider influence without which it could not havebeen effective. In the wider community, the reformed behaviour of thosethat had been personally threatened set a persuasive example that calmedsociety and reinforced mass conformity. The result was a politicalequilibrium, one that was conditionally stable, but primed to break downwhen the minority ceased to fear the consequences of self-expression.
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